


2023

OSINT Report 3

CARAVAN OF LIGHT

AN OSINT ANALYSIS OF THE ONLINE ORGANISATION WHO ATTEMPTED TO MOBILISE THE CROSSING OF THOUSANDS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES FROM TURKEY TO EUROPE



AN OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

DEVELOPED BY:

AGENFOR INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION

CO-FUNDED BY:

European Commission Directorate General for
Justice and Consumers

<https://www.agenformedia.com>

ABOUT THE REPORT

The report has been developed in the framework of the EU-funded projects "BIGOSINT" and "UNCHAINED". The projects has respectively received funding from the European Commission's Internal Security Fund - Police, Grant Agreement 101038761 and 101021612.

This report has been undertaken by Agenfor International as part of the dissemination actions of the EU-funded projects UNCHAINED and BIGOSINT, and further aims to demonstrate the prominence of public-private cooperation, which can broaden the horizons in terms of preventing and countering the ever-changing forms of THB (Trafficking in Human-Beings).

The OSINT Reports Series, of which this report constitutes the third release, has been developed with the aim of providing an overview of the potential applications, on a European scale, of open-source research and analysis methodologies in prevention and mitigation activities directed against a range of potential threats. Each report in the OSINT Reports Series will provide insights, gathered through open source intelligence, concerning a potential threat identified by Agenfor International Foundation with the support of public and private partners.

To conduct the research and analysis, the team involved in the project relied both on freely available tools and on an AI-powered OSINT system.

In accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), all available personal data have been anonymised and/or redacted.

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INTRODUCTION TO PHYGITAL TRAFFICKING OF HUMAN BEINGS

This report analyses a new phenomenon called Phygital Trafficking of Human Beings in the context of a chain of OSINT analysis undertaken by Agenfor International as part of the dissemination actions of the EU-funded projects UNCHAINED and BIGOSINT.

Phygital THB is a new concept for an old poly-criminal phenomenon, namely trafficking in human beings (THB), which continues to morph and adapt in the new globalized and cyber world. Phygital THB is characterised by interlinked online and offline modi operandi for the sole purpose of illicit gain, which violates people's fundamental rights and dignity.

From a legal perspective, Phygital THB is a multiform manifestation of serious crime (Eurocrime as defined by Art. 83(1) TFEU, third paragraph), which exploits a variety of vulnerabilities affecting people, using a combination of digital and physical modi operandi. From a phenomenological perspective, Phygital THB is an intersectional phenomenon with an obvious gender dimension, involving mainly EU nationals, foreigners, women, and girls as victims, as well as social groups exposed to wars and emergencies. Discriminatory stereotypes of ideal victims and fragmented policy and practices at the Member State (MS) level hinder the identification of victims of trafficking, particularly when intersecting with discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity, or migration status.

Phygital THB can assume very diverse organisational models, such as transnational, organized crime groups (OCGs), extended parental groups (exPGs)[1] but also state-sponsored organisations, which are at the center of this report, and a new "fluid" cyber network using online "Digitalized Services".[2] Therefore, Phygital THB is often characterized by diverse specific sub-cultural, technical, and sociological/organisational dimensions, with significant ethnic and geo-political components.



THE CARAVAN OF LIGHT

At the beginning of September 2022, rumours started circulating online regarding a convoy being organised in Turkey, composed of tens of thousands of Syrian refugees. According to such rumours the goal of the convoy, alternatively called the "migrant caravan", "Convoy of Light" or "Caravan al-Noor" from the Arabic name chosen by the organisers (قافلة_النور), was to ensure its members a safe crossing of the Turkish-EU border via Greece. In the following weeks, news about such a convoy gained traction across the web and started being reported by a variety of online news outlets, including major Western news websites and Russian media. At the same time, the social media channels (Telegram groups in primis), created by the organisers of the convoy, saw a steep increase in their number of members, with the main Telegram group reaching up to 80.000 members.

The present report aims to analyse the above-mentioned Phygital attempt to organise a large-scale migrant convoy, with the assistance of open-source intelligence techniques and tools and support of state entities.

The next section of the report will provide a brief description of the context in which this initiative was attempted, with a focus on the conditions (both legal and material) of Syrians under temporary protection currently being hosted in Turkey, and on the recurring tensions between the Turkish and Greek governments. Subsequently, the research steps taken by the team to gather necessary data will be presented. This section will be followed by the core component of the report, namely the analysis of the data and relevant information collected. Two different hypotheses on the nature of the organisation will conclude the report.

SYRIANS IN TURKEY: AN OVERVIEW

Within the last decade, the influx of refugees from war-torn countries changed the facade of Turkey drastically. The ongoing civil war in Syria since 2011 has caused over 6.8 million Syrian nationals to flee the country. The number of refugees hosted has reached 3.7 million as of 2022, making Turkey the largest refugee-hosting nation in the world.[3] The growing refugee population has become a prominent political issue, often cited as the most urgent problem to be addressed by both the public and politicians. The economic crisis, fuelled by high rates of inflation, further flamed the debate around the refugee crisis and the acceleration of Xenophobia towards Syrians.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Turkey is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, alongside its 1967 Protocol, with a “geographical limitation” clause. The limitation entails that Turkey would assume responsibility for refugees only coming from members of the Council of Europe but does not recognize people fleeing from the Middle East as refugees legally. However, it is possible for Syrians to apply for the refugee status and resettlement through the UNHCR system.[4] As of October 2011, all Syrians, Palestinian refugees and stateless persons were deemed eligible for the “temporary protection” status, and an open-door policy was adopted. In 2013 and 2014, a specific legislation was enacted bringing about more rights for Syrians residing in Turkey, such free access to emergency healthcare and subsidized access to private healthcare, identity cards, right to education and information in their language concerning the temporary protection regime.[5]



ECONOMIC CRISIS AND INCREASING XENOPHOBIA

Growing antipathy and discomfort against Syrian refugees amongst the Turkish population is further fuelled by the economic crisis. The collapse of the Turkish Lira and soaring consumer prices have made the Syrian refugees a scapegoat for the shattering of the economy. Over the past two-year span, there has been a notable increase in the hate speech and hate crimes against Syrians, often fuelled by the Turkish media including the pro-government and opposition outlets. On August 11, 2021, a group of Turkish residents attacked the workplaces and homes of Syrians in Ankara, after a Syrian teenager stabbed and killed a Turkish teenager in a fight. As the 2023 elections are approaching, politicians often build upon the refugee discourse that further escalates anti-refugee sentiments and suggests that Syrians should be returned to the war-torn country. Erdoğan's coalition government has also pledged to resettle the Syrian refugees to Turkish-occupied safe zones in Northern Syria, creating great discomfort and fear amongst Syrians in Turkey.

IS SYRIA SAFE? DEPORTATION RISKS

Between July and August 2022, news about a possible reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus had emerged, as there had been a considerable change in the rhetoric, especially from the Turkish side. Even though both parties exchanged requests to rekindle official dialogue channels, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu stated that Turkey does not have “preconditions for dialogue” with the Syrian government as long as the talks focus on border security.[6] Syrian counter-party Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad stated that any “normalisation with Turkey will only be achieved when Ankara meets three demands: withdrawal from Syrian territory; an end to support for opposition organisations; and non-intervention in internal Syrian affairs”.[7]

In May 2022, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey announced that he intends to resettle one million refugees in northern Syria, in areas not controlled by the government, even though Syria remains unsafe for returning refugees. According to the UNHCR statistics of June 2022, 15,149 Syrian refugees had voluntarily returned to Syria so far. In addition, the local authorities who control Bab al-Hawa and Bab al-Salam border crossings stated that between February and August 2022, 11,645 people were returned through Bab al-Hawa and 8,404 through Bab al-Salam.[8] Human Rights Watch (HRW) claims that most of the individuals who returned were forced to sign voluntary return forms through coercive and violent methods. The current situation and wave of resettlement has been a driving factor for most Syrian refugees in possibly assembling the “Caravan of Light”, motivated by fears of being deported back to Syria.

GREECE – TURKEY BORDER TENSIONS

Tensions between Greece and Turkey continue to escalate in relation to the disagreements on demilitarised islands and the treatment of illegal migration. Turkey has recently accused Greece of using Russian-made S-300 missile systems in Crete to lock onto Turkish jets last August. Ankara further claimed that Greek F-16s harassed Turkish jets by putting them under a radar lock during a NATO mission over the Eastern Mediterranean. Recently, Turkey has made complaints with NATO after US-made armoured vehicles were deployed to Greek islands, which Ankara claims should be demilitarised in accordance with international law obligations.

In a recent speech delivered within the UN Assembly, Erdogan accused Greece of committing “crimes against humanity” by carrying out potentially deadly push backs towards refugees trying to cross from Turkey to Greek islands, while Greek minister for civil protection Takis Theodorikakos accused Turkey of “weaponising” migration to apply political pressure on Greece and other EU member states.[9]



RESEARCH STEPS


The first mentions online found on Twitter about the migrant caravan that have been identified, date back to September 8, 2022, when several users started sharing similar messages on the topic.[10]



"This is all thanks to the people and the Turkish state. We are about to lighten the burden of the country that has supported us for 10 years. They have carried us with their hearts and souls and have been our support. They have protected us from the bombings, the air force and the war. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts, but the countries of the Union must bear a part of this burden to relieve the Turkish people. We ask all countries."

From September 9, 2022, the first articles retrieved online reporting the news about the migrant caravan, as well as the exponential growth of its potential participants, were observed.[11] The websites that reported the news on that day were both in Arabic and English language. On the same day, an online petition in support of the convoy appeared on Aavaz.org.[12] The logo of the movement also appeared for the first time on September 9, again on Twitter.[13] This logo was also used for several weeks in official Telegram chats.

Using the search function of the OSINT platform and entering a series of keywords, the organisation's official YouTube channel was identified. Within the descriptions of several published videos, a series of direct links to join a number of Telegram groups were indicated. These Telegram groups turned out to be the most relevant tools in the organisation of this initiative, as well as the main source of information for this report. This information, cross-referenced with other online searches conducted through search engines and the OSINT platform used, were analysed and reported in the following section.



The Current YouTube Channel

ANALYSIS

YOUTUBE CHANNEL


The YouTube channel hosts numerous short videos. Initially, these videos updated the viewers on the developments of the migrant caravan. While following the continuously postponing of the commencement of the caravan[14], the videos uploaded started to provide more general information concerning the political and economic situation in Turkey and its effects on the Syrian population in the country, and to a lesser extent concerning the developments in the Syrian conflict. In general, the content and tone of the videos seemed to have a rather appreciative and indebted tone towards Turkey.

Regarding the group's YouTube channel, one relevant element which must be stressed is that although the first available video was published on 10 September 2022, the YouTube channel was created more than four years earlier, on 2 May 2018. In the online archives (e.g. Wayback Machine) no content was found that was published before September 2022, but the existence of this channel, with a URL that does not recall the migrant caravan (ROLD_COM), suggests that this channel was created in the past for other purposes.

ANALYSIS

TELEGRAM GROUPS

As previously mentioned, in the descriptions of several of the initial videos uploaded on the YouTube channel, a series of links were found, which in turn made it possible to retrieve up to 14 links to join the affiliated Telegram groups.[15]



The screenshot shows a YouTube video player for a video titled "قافلة النور CARAVAN OF LIGHT". The video description contains a list of 14 Telegram group links, each preceded by a line indicating the group's name in Arabic. The links are as follows:

- الهجرة الى اوربا قافلة النور قافلة النور ديزني <https://t.me/+hehd23VM-1YzZmI0>
- الهجرة الى اوربا قافلة النور: قافلة النور فقط بورصا <https://t.me/+IR6NSyk-qh9IMDQ0>
- قافلة اسطنبول <https://t.me/+cBwPNeHs4UkzZmY0>
- قافلة مرسين <https://t.me/+PUV8wN6bYPozY2Fk>
- قافلة انطاليا <https://t.me/+Wl34XZb9auNIZTl0>
- قافلة عنتاب <https://t.me/+NTPcPczQWcdmZDU0>
- قافلة اورفا <https://t.me/+170yYcn7BaRhZmM0>
- قافلة انقره <https://t.me/+gxbsfjBgJhM4YTM0>
- قافلة النور هاتاي <https://t.me/+1P4CMBQC0CA1ZJVK>
- قافلة النور اضنه <https://t.me/+hvhIplBI6X4tkYJQ0>

The first YouTube video uploaded to the channel, showing the respective Telegram groups

These groups can be roughly divided into three types: the main group, local groups and the group for reporting violations or attacks that might happen while attempting to cross the border. All groups are created and managed in an almost identical and very top-down manner: each group is created by a user and then managed by a small number of other accounts, usually one or two "supervisors". The local groups served the purpose of organising the travels from different cities in Turkey to the borders in which the caravan would commence its movement towards Greece. With the exception of the group reserved for the reporting of violations, it is not possible to comment on the messages of the admins or to send messages in the chat in any of the groups; however, in a few of these channels the possibility of commenting have been granted for limited periods of time.

السوريين والعرب في تركيا

Mohmmad Sweed joined group by link from Group

عطر اليل joined group by link from Group

Ahmad Abo bhr joined group by link from Group

TO	The Caravan Of Light's chief	21:09
	https://t.me/+IR6NSyk-qh9IMDQ0	قافلة النور فقط بورصا
	—	
	https://t.me/+c8wPNeHs4UkzZmY0	قافلة اسطنبول
	—	
	https://t.me/+PUV8wN6bYPozY2Fk	قافلة مرسين
	—	
	https://t.me/+Wl34XZb9auNlZTlO	قافلة انطاليا
	—	
	https://t.me/+NTPcPczQWcdmZDU0	قافلة عنتاب
	—	
	https://t.me/+170yYcn7BaRhZmM0	قافلة اورفا
	—	
	https://t.me/+gxbfsfj8gjhm4YTM0	قافلة انقره
	—	
	https://t.me/+1P4CMBQC0CA1ZjVk	قافلة النور هاتاي
	—	
	https://t.me/+hvHlpBl6X4tkYjQ0	قافلة النور اضنه

The links that direct to local groups of different cities across Turkey, shared by one of the administrators with the nickname "The Caravan of Light's Chief."

The main group was created on September 4, 2022, and immediately saw a vertical growth in its membership. On September 14, 2022, it already had more than 80,000 participants. The group was (username @xbiiwiwlx) and managed by other accounts. Salim was one of the accounts in charge of the general coordination of the various groups and he sporadically intervened in the local groups. In an Al-Jazeera online article, it is mentioned that Jad Salim introduced himself as the founder of the campaign, an element also corroborated by the spokesperson of the convoy, who, like all the other organisers involved, had wished to remain anonymous.[16] Only other information gathered from a different article on the identity of the organisers is that one of them, who interacted with the AFP News Agency, was a 46-year-old Syrian refugee.[17]

ANALYSIS OF THE CHATS CONTENT

Data exported from the Telegram groups and the analysis of over 100,000 messages revealed interesting points concerning the course of the Caravan of Light. The first relevant message was sent to the abovementioned main group on September 13, 2022, by one of the admins identified to be leading the operation. The general tones of the messages could be classified as reassuring and knowledgeable, citing international legislation, human rights obligations of countries and especially the United Nations, implying the existence of a well-informed administration, which is leading the operation.

services, as they should be the responsibility of the Syrian Interim Government, which has not said a word about this convoy until this hour.

Brothers in the Syrian Interim Government, we are Syrians and it is from the womb of this revolution that you are leading at this stage Will we hear from you a word after the largest humanitarian organization in the world threatened 100 thousand Syrian people with death, hunger and dispersion, has anyone contacted international institutions and governments

In order to convince the Syrian people not to emigrate by implementing failed UN resolutions that are similar to failed small projects offered by international organizations in neighboring countries to Syria, the project grant is \$ 1,351, which aims only to cut off the assistance of the Turkish Red Crescent under the auspices of the United Nations and the European Union \$ 12.5 per month per person when you look at this figure, you feel that you and the amount are a burden on the Turkish state and a waste of its time until you feel that you are a heavy burden on the ATM .the High Commission has made us a burden on neighboring countries and a fat material for the countries that control the decision. is there a glimmer of the hope offered by the world is to overthrow the criminal regime and live a decent life in Syria so that we can say to ourselves that we have to be patient for a while and return to our country...

Our demands :

1–the United Nations should move quickly towards the Greek and Bulgarian borders and stop the massacres it is committing against asylum seekers .

2–the United Nations should support refugees in the neighboring countries of Syria in a real way, not technically and formally

3–the United Nations must fulfill its legal duties to protect Syrian refugees from all forms of physical, psychological and political abuse of refugees who have emigrated from Syria due to the non-application of its resolutions, so it bears the consequences of non-application of these resolutions .

4–the Syrian Interim Government must do its job and appear as a 16:34 defender of the legitimate rights of its people .these rights are one of the most basic rights shared by humans and animals in the world by resorting to safety for those whose lives are in danger.

5–the interim government should represent the Syrians and protect them at least politically, even with a word, so that the Syrian people feel that there is someone standing next to them.

6–the interim government should communicate with the EU countries to open their doors to this convoy or find immediate solutions, not verbal or media, to convince us not to migrate.

Finally, let the brothers who joined the caravan of light know that we will not retreat and will not stop, even if it costs us to create a human bridge to reach safety so that our children, brothers and family can live a dignified life befitting this great people.we will be an example to follow throughout history. we will put our hands in each other's hands and tie them with chains. either we will all arrive or we will all fall and the whole world will fall with us.

Advisory committee

Released in September

Long live the people, long live a free, fatherly Syria, mercy for the martyrs and freedom for the detainees.

Demands made by the Caravan of Light administrators.

The administrators also identified the caravan as a peaceful endeavour without violent practices and with no monetary motivations, but rather solemnly operating with the aim of providing better life standards for Syrian people.

Variety of flyers and advertisements were made, addressing the objectives of the Caravan. Even though the identities of all the administrators were kept anonymous, one of the flyers indicate exactly which village/district each admin belongs to, hence purposely trying to build trust within the Telegram groups by asserting the commonalities and demonstrating empathy. The announcement further indicates that the admins of the caravan are all very well educated, mostly composed of lawyers, engineers, and doctors.



The announcement by the Caravan of Light administrators revealing their professions and which village/region they belong to in Syria.

Another interesting aspect, which arose from the monitoring of the Telegram chats, was the tone and approach of the caravan administration towards the Turkish authorities. Often, in their messages there was a frequent emphasis on the founding father “Ataturk”, which holds great prominence and value for Turks. A message sent in the Istanbul group of the Caravan, advised the publication of content with Ataturk and Turkish flags, with the beliefs that it would facilitate an easier passage for the caravan.



One of the administrators' message to the main group of the Caravan of Light stating: “Turks protected us, shawled us with its bosom, and fed us from the bounties of the country, and a country in which there is much good. There are many good things in it.”




“Brothers, these tweets are very important for the Turkish street. It is the one who will be the biggest guarantor for the safe exit of this convoy. Please share the photos with the tweets from the flags and photos of the President of the Turkish Republic and Mr. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic”

Example of a social media post on Ataturk


Furthermore, the messages often carried an indebted tone to the Turkish government, for hosting millions of Syrian refugees from the beginning of the civil war. While expressing gratitude, it was stated that it is time for the European countries to equally carry the “burden”.

When the evolution of the content of the messages is reviewed, it is possible to observe that the group administrators were often postponing the commencement date of the caravan, creating anticipation and tension within the group members. The determined route was from the Ipsala checkpoint, being one of the main border points between Turkey and Greece. A lot of assistance was given to the group members, explaining how to travel to Edirne from various cities of Turkey, while some members shared videos and pictures of themselves, already claiming to be on their way to the assembly point.




Routes towards Edirne, a city right in the Turkey-Greek border were often shared with the group members.

Numerous videos and pictures shared throughout the groups were later identified to be false, belonging to different years and occurrences. The organisational phase of the caravan was also carried out professionally, as the rights and duties of Syrian citizens within the scope of international law were shared in the groups, alongside a detailed list on what they might need throughout the journey, such as clothing, medicine and food supplies.



The list of supplies that are considered to be necessary, such as food, clothing and medicine, for the travel towards Europe.

It can also be seen that some members of the groups actively warned other members to not join the caravan, resembling the situation to what happened in 2020, when 13.000 refugees similarly gathered to no avail at the Turkish-Greek border.



“Brothers, there is no need to take such risks, we have seen what happened in 2020, everyone rushed towards the borders, but neither the UN nor Greece opened their borders, on the contrary, they increased security in these borders, assembling soldiers across Europe, where most people there suffered. If the international organisations would have opened their doors just like you claimed, I would also join you, but better be wary of what happened in 2020.”

After two weeks of media coverage and attempts, which eventually did not solidify into a concrete action, the telegram groups were transformed into “support groups” for Arabs living in Turkey. Most of the text messages related to the migrant caravan were deleted, and the groups now serve as news and communication channels for Arabs living across the country. Some of the administrators have deleted their accounts, while others made slight modifications in their usernames, by adding emojis and slightly altering the way names were written.

POTENTIAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CASE ANALYSIS

Based on the data and information collected online and analysed, it is currently not possible to define with certainty the true motivations and the nature of this online initiative. However, it is possible to present some hypotheses, to be further investigated in the future, also through tools and techniques other than open-source intelligence.

Hypothesis 1

The organisation of the migrant caravan was a spontaneous phenomenon, unconnected to international political dynamics, which managed to gather an important online following thanks both to the organisers' skills, especially in the digital and coordination spheres, and to the fact that it gave voice to a feeling of discontent among the Syrian population currently hosted in Turkey, rekindling their hopes of moving to Europe in a legal or at least protected manner.

Elements supporting this hypothesis:

- Initial statements by the organisers clearly refer to incidents of racism and discrimination against Syrians by the Turkish population.
- From the audio messages sent by the organisers in Telegram chats, although the voices are camouflaged, it is usually possible to recognise a Levantine/Syrian accent.
- The organisers always showed a willingness to seek agreement not only with the Turkish authorities but also with international and human rights organisations to ensure an orderly and safe passage to Europe, a sign that the primary interest was the well-being of potential participants in the caravan. Further signs of attention to participants are the creation of the special chat room where caravan members could report violations or assaults to the organisers, and the specific guidance provided in the chats on the type of clothing, equipment, and luggage to best cope with the walk to Europe.

Hypothesis 2

The organisation of the migrant caravan was sponsored by a state actor with an interest in creating (or threatening to create) problems for European countries, especially those bordering Turkey, or with an interest in demonstrating to the public opinion that it was acting to reduce the presence of Syrian refugees on Turkish territory. At this respect according to the second hypothesis, The Caravan of Light and forced immigration at large can be considered as an asymmetric tool used in the context of the hidden conflict between Turkey and Greece, where non-state actors plays an important role.



Evidence supports this hypothesis:

- The organisers decided to remain anonymous using rather advanced arrangements, and demonstrated developed organisational, coordination and social media skills.
- The growth in the number of participants in the various Telegram chats was very rapid, leading the team to suspect that at least a part of them could be fake accounts.
- The emergence of the organisational machine behind the migrant caravan coincided with a period of fairly pronounced tensions between Turkey and Greece.
- In the past, the Turkish government had already been accused of using migrants and/or refugees as an instrument of pressure towards the Greek government or European institutions.
- Apart from the accusations of racism and discrimination suffered by Syrian refugees in Turkey, cited by the organisers as one of the main reasons for organising the migrant caravan, the tone used towards the Turkish authorities by the organisers in the various Telegram chats has always been mild.

CONCLUSION

Following international estimations, THB accounts for an illicit economy EUR 150 billion a year, with annual profits estimated at EUR 29.4 billion globally [18], affecting every country in the world. Two thirds of this illicit economy (US\$ 99 billion), come from commercial sexual exploitation, while another US\$ 51 billion results from forced economic exploitation, including domestic work, agriculture, other areas and economic activities.

As highlighted by the report, the new DaaS services (Digital as a Service) play a very important role for the exploiters, as they often resort to advanced applications to destabilize hostile countries through the manipulation of migrant flows. The resorted methods could be listed as follows:

Social media campaigns, advertisements placed on social media pages (Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, etc.)

- Recruitment and communication, through secured and encrypted apps (FaceTime, IMO, Messenger, Signal, Signal, Skype, Viber, WA, WeChat, Zalo, etc..) including guides on video-sharing platforms distributing essential logistic instructions, satellite images and photos, planned routes (Google Maps waypoints, GPS data, etc.).
- Guidance, including mapping applications (Maps.me, Google Maps) for remotely guiding migrants across borders through tailor-made tutorials and YouTube videos containing detailed guides on how to navigate migrant routes, where to cross borders or buy fake documents, how to find smuggling hotspots, shelter or assistance.
- Payments, including online transfer of fees and documentation of payment proof via messaging services. Countermeasures adopted by smugglers to anonymise their services, via AppLocks, Secure Folders, burner applications, DiskDigger, private VPN connections, or clone apps, Fake GPS and modified display caller ID (Numberbook).

There are no limits to the creativity of a human means in applying ways to exploit people in order to gain financial and political profit.



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